Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 1 by Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 1
Volume Author/Editor: Lawrence H. Summers, editor




Chapter Title: Amnesty, Enforcement, and Tax Policy
Chapter Author: Herman B. Leonard, Richard J. Zeckhauser
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10929
Chapter pages in book: (p. 55 - 86)Herman B. Leonard and Richard I. Zeckhauser
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and NBER,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and NBER
Amnesty, Enforcement, and Tax
Policy
Massachusetts raised $85 million through a tax amnesty program; New
York collected more than four times that amount. In California, Illinois,
Alabama, Arizona, Wisconsin, and twelve other states, people and cor-
porations willingly stood in line for hours to pay the taxes they owed
while delinquency penalties were temporarily suspended, to deliver
bills and checks and coins to state treasuries. Many were choosing to
make a first appearance on the tax rolls.
Tax amnesties have raised hundreds of millions of dollars that revenue
collectors would otherwise have found difficult or impossible to capture.
Amnesties have swelled the rolls of paid-up taxpayers and increased the
population of regular filers. State revenue department estimates suggest
that a well-publicized amnesty combined with stricter future enforce-
ment considerably increases the level of future voluntary compliance
with tax laws.
Amnesties may have had some less positive effects as well. They may
have angered law-abiding taxpayers who dislike seeing tax breaks given
to abusers of the system. Current amnesties may have encouraged some
citizens to believe that there will be future amnesties as well, reducing
their incentives to keep current on their payments. Not surprisingly, con-
siderable controversy has arisen over whether (and how) tax policy
should make use of amnesty programs.
In practice, tax amnesties have been coupled with enhanced enforce-
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ment efforts, a feature that seems essential to preserve the legitimacy of
the tax code. (Moreover, given some factions' opposition to any reduc-
tions of penalties, the promise of more vigorous enforcement is proba-
bly necessary to win political approval of an amnesty program.) An
amnesty and enforcement program twists the schedule of expected tax
penalties, lowering them temporarily but raising them later, thus provid-
ing a strong incentive for offenders to come forward. An important fur-
ther effect is to make future compliance more attractive. Citizens who
have past delinquencies to conceal may hesitate to file an accurate cur-
rent return lest it raise questions about previous years. But once the slate
has been wiped clean under an amnesty program, their cost of future
compliance is reduced.
Should the federal government follow the example of the states and
offer a tax amnesty of its own? Today, when unprecedented federal
budget deficits have reached 5 percent of gross national product (GNP),
and many believe that tax evasion is costing the government as much as
$100 billion a year, this question seems increasingly worthy of attention.
Barring massive increases in enforcement expenditures, an amnesty
might be the only way to bring many evaders back into compliance. Con-
gress's recent approval of a sweeping tax reform, designed in part to re-
store legitimacy to the tax code, provides an opportune time to consider
a federal tax amnesty coupled with more vigorous enforcement to capi-
talize on and help mark a new regime.
Some observers have argued that the decision whether to offer an am-
nesty should be based on a fairly mechanical weighing of additional tax
collections to be achieved now against possible losses later. Such an
approach, which in effect considers an amnesty program purely as a
revenue-raising device, would be most appropriate if the program could
be expected to raise a significant fraction of tax revenues, say 3 or 4 per-
cent of total collections. Existing estimates, none of which claims to be
more than speculation, are less optimistic. Alien H. Lerman, of the
Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of the Treasury, suggests that an
amnesty might raise $1 bfflion (not including revenue due to greater fu-
ture enforcement). Our assessment suggests that a combined amnesty!
enforcement programwhich political forces may make an inevitable
couplingcould raise as much as $10 billion over the status quo, but
even that sum would be only about 1.5 percent of revenues. To judge the
virtues of an amnesty, policy makers will have to weigh the revenues
raised against its other consequences, both positive and negative, which
may be substantial. For example, some elements of a tax amnesty will
support, and other elements wifi undermine, the legitimacy of the tax
system and therefore the revenues that it collects. Given the salience ofAMNESTY, ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX POLICY 57
taxes in the citizen's interactions with the government, a tax amnesty
may also affect the perceived overall legitimacy of government.
Many state amnesties have been accompanied by a significant strength-
ening of enforcement efforts. The revenues thus generated must be
viewed as a product of the joint instrument. How then should we assess
the efficacy of a prospective federal amnesty? Should we consider merely
the effects of adding an amnesty, leaving present enforcement efforts un-
changed? Or should we compare the status quo with an amnesty pro-
gram that also includes a stepped-up enforcement program? Or should
we assume a strict enforcement program and see what an amnesty adds?
In our view, an amnesty is a political instrument, a compromising
counterbalance that helps lead to stricter enforcement efforts. (Indeed,
Congress may never find time for a consequential discussion of enforce-
ment except in the context of debate over a federal amnesty.) Thus a fed-
eral amnesty, together with the enforcement efforts likely to accompany
it, should be judged against the realistic alternative, the enforcement
expected without an amnesty. Moreover, to assess the full effects of an
amnesty on revenue, we must consider the future impact of the accom-
panying enforcement changes. The experience of the states, as we shall
see, suggests that enhanced future revenues exceed the direct revenues
of the amnesty itself. Any revenue projections must remain highly spec-
ulative, however, making it all the more important to examine the other
consequences of a potential amnesty.
1. When Do We Give Amnesty?
To help focus our thoughts about tax amnesties, we believe it is useful to
consider the justifications for other kinds of amnesty. When have so-
cieties given amnesties? What characteristics do amnesties share? What
purposes are they alleged to serve, and what do they actually accom-
plish? When are they socially productive? Having explored these issues,
we shall return to the special case of tax amnesties.
Amnesties are not unusual. In the past two decades, governments in
the United States have given amnesties for draft evasion, parking tickets,
unreturned library books, and now tax evasion. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant amnesty was signed into law this fall; it offers permanent resi-
dence status to an estimated 4 million ifiegal aliens who entered the
United States before January 1982. In conjunction with the amnesty, sub-
stantial penalties will be imposed on employers of ineligible and future
ifiegal aliens, with a promised increase in enforcement efforts. This am-
nesty eases the transition to a new regime, in part by exempting old
offenders, whose sheer numbers would make strict enforcement impos-58 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
sible. It also reflects a political compromise between defenders of pres-
ent illegal residents (amnesty supporters) and the interests seeking to
stem the illegal tide, who gain significant sanctions for new offenses.
It is common, though not universal, for the winners of a war to pro-
vide some form of amnesty for those who honestly supported and
honorably defended the losing side. Many societies give continuing am-
nesties for some offenses. Statutes of limitations erase liabffity for torts
and for prosecution for misdemeanors and most felonies (but not federal
tax fraud!); large library fines are often imposed but seem almost never
to be collected. Some amnesties are formal and require an application
process and documentation; others are unadvertised.1 For example,
most revenue collectors waive some penalties for taxpayers who claim
administrative error as a cause of their noncompliance with tax laws and
who voluntarily appear to pay the tax and any interest due.
Other social conventions akin to amnesty are also common. The en-
forcement of some laws is so casual as to constitute a practical amnesty.
Drivers in large packs of automobiles traveling a few miles per hour over
the speed limit are virtually immune from speeding tickets; citizens are
so unlikely to be penalized for keeping small amounts of marijuana for
private use in their homes that society might as well have declared an
amnesty; ancient laws about sexual practices are routinely ignored and
largely unenforced. Lax enforcement sometimes reflects simple priority
setting. Some laws are viewed as obsolete, given changing social norms,
and we naturally direct scarce enforcement resources toward more im-
portant offenses. But other choices are unrelated to the seriousness of
the crimes. Low-level street crime in some communities enjoys something
like continuing amnesty because jails are overcrowded; enforcement au-
thorities, aware that penalties are being waived for most convictions, di-
rect their attention and arrests toward offenders who can successfully
compete for space in jail.
For many violations, however, societies never give amnesties and vir-
tually never even give pardons. For heinous crimes, major frauds like
embezzlement, or desertion from a combat unit under fire, no serious
consideration is given to blanket abatements of penalties (though in care-
fully reviewed cases with extenuating circumstances, an individual of-
fender may be shown leniency).
In what circumstances are amnesties particularly likely? First, so-
cieties generally give amnesties for offenses committed by a relatively
1. In Biblicaj times, some were even regularly scheduled. The Old Testament refers to jubi-
lee years, at half-century intervals, in which debtor slaves were to be freed and "alien-
ated property" was to be returned to its rightful owner. See Leviticus 25:8-34.AMNESTY, ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX POLICY 59
large number of otherwise reasonably ordinary citizens, whose alle-
giance and noncriminal reputations we wish to maintain or reclaim.
A classic example is draft evasion in a war that is unpopular or widely
perceived as unjust. Many young men evaded the draft in the Vietnam
era. Though by no means a random sample of draft-age citizens, they
were not significantly set apart from other citizens except as a result of
evading the draft. Similarly, people with many parking tickets are difficult
to distinguish from the rest of us.2 When a law is sufficiently flouted,
it becomes ifiegitimate. In some cases, we modify the law. But when,
as with taxes and ifiegal aliens, changing the law is particularly un-
desirablewe need government revenues, and we will not throw open
our doors to immigrantsamnesty may provide a way to recapture
legitimacy.
Second, societies are more likely to give amnesties for an offense that
did not directly damage an identified party. Contrast draft evasion with
desertion under fire. Draft evasion certainly affects other people
someone else wifi be forced to servebut it is hard to know exactly
whom.3 Desertion from a combat unit under fire, in sharp contrast, di-
rectly endangers the lives of an identified group of individuals and is
therefore harder to forgive.
Third, we are more likely to declare an amnesty for a violation that is
unrelated to other offenses. Society is more likely to provide amnesty for
private home use of small amounts of marijuana than for assault, theft,
or burglary. Smoking marijuana at home, at least under current social
mores, is not a very strong indication of sociopathic behavior. Being in-
In some cases (parking tickets and library fines may be examples) our inability to enforce
rules has led to undesirable equilibrium involving little compliance, little revenue, and
many offenders outside the social contract. Better enforcement technology (for example,
computerized recordkeeping or the Denver Boot) may improve the ongoing equilibrium,
reducing the need for amnesties.
One suspects, however, that those with draft lottery numbers just ahead of the cutoff,
who would have escaped being drafted had there been fewer evaders, might have been
more likely than others to oppose the draft evasion amnesty.
Box 1 AMNESTIES ARE MORE LIKELY WHEN
Many otherwise ordinary citizens participated in illicit activity.
The offense did not directly harm identified individuals
The offense is not chronic or linked to a pattern of other offenses.
Enforcement will be nearly impossible anyway.60 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
volved in street crime is more strongly linked to a pattern society wants
to discourage.
Fourth, amnesties seem to be more likely when society wifi find it
difficult to enforce the penalty anyway. Forgiving library fines is a good
way to recover books, particularly when the alternative is to have neither
the books nor the fines. Proponents of amnesty for ifiegal aliens argue
that it would be too costly and too painful to find and deport the multi-
tude who established residence in the United States some years ago,
and that society might as well declare this reality to be in conformance
with the law. Society gains by eliminating the deadweight loss (of books
not available at the library and of residents who must avoid contact with
public agencies) and by bringing the violators into conformance with so-
cial norms when there is little to gain by keeping them estranged.
2. Benefits and Costs of Amnesties
What do societies seek to gain by offering amnesties? Commonly, there
are seven main benefits. First, an amnesty may enable us to collect some
proportion of past debts that otherwise would be uncollectable. In 1983,
for example, Philadelphia collected over 160,000 volumes during its
highly publicized one-week library amnestybooks that would other-
wise have been lost to its system. (That event apparently provoked much
mutual congratulation and removed a load of guilt from 35,000 patrons,
whom the library praised as showing "great respect for reading and librar-
ies.") Parking and tax amnesties do not eliminate the original charges, just
the supplementary penalties. In effect, delinquents are offered a chance
to clear the slate by paying some of what they owe. Illegal aliens eligible
for permanent residence under our new legislation will be allowed eigh-
teen months to get on the books, become taxpayers, and so on Failing
this, they will be liable to expulsion.
Second, amnesties encourage renewed compliance. After a parking
amnesty, people may take more care to park legally. This benefit is par-
ticularly large when, in the absence of an amnesty, there is a strong in-
centive for delinquents to remain so. A draft evader who wanted to
return from Canada and go straight in 1972 no longer faced Vietnam but
Leavenworth. Tax evaders, to hide past delinquency, often must con-
tinue to cheat. A bank cannot advance further credit to a corporation (or
country) in default, even if the new loan is expected to be profitable.4
4. It is often difficult to distinguish profitable and realistically refinanced loans from refi-
nancmg designed to conceal bad debts. The Small Business Administration has often
been accused of using rollovers to keep down the reported rate of default, and some ofAMNESTY, ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX POLICY 61
Amnesties allow society to rearrange incentives that otherwise favor
continued noncompliance on the part of a delinquent.
Third, giving an amnesty often makes the society better able to control
the future. The conquering army that offers amnesty to its vanquished
opponents if they surrender their armsand threatens powerful action
against those who do not cooperate by a given datenot only begins to
heal society's wounds but dramatically reduces the potential for future
armed conflict. (The military analogy seems appropriate in judging the
tax amnesty of our home state of Massachusetts.) Parking ticket am-
nesties result in a current address list useful in future collection efforts,
thus making future compliance more likely. An amnesty for toxic waste
dumps might permit society to find out where they are before poisons
filter into groundwater. And a tax amnesty makes future adherence to
the tax code more likely by removing the need to conceal past sins. An
amnesty is desirable if it lowers the cost of behaving well in the future.
Fourth, amnesties allow society to forgive violators who are unlikely
to become repeat offenders, penitents, individuals who have become de-
linquent by blunder, or offenders who have transgressed some rule
society regards as minor. Some violations may have sprung from well-
intentioned behavior. For example, many of those who evaded the Viet-
nam draft did so out of honest disagreement with their government; they
can claim a loyalty to principles that society strongly supports. Al-
though society cannot affirm their decision to evade, it may want to miti-
gate the penalty; amnesty after the war provides one avenue.
Fifth, amnesties help to reduce or eliminate deadweight burdens from
a social schism or from individual guilt. The threat of punishment may
deter an offense, but once deterrence has failed, the continuing guilt or
ostracism serves little purpose. Punishment may deter future offenses,
but it cannot change what is already done. Once the desire for retribu-
tion or revenge has been long enough served, the time may come to bury
the hatchet to reduce the implied waste.
Sixth, amnesties may permit society to declare that it made a mistake
and now wants to change its mind. Some believe that the Vietnam draft
amnesty is at least ambiguous in this respect and, therefore, perhaps
particularly dangerous. Establishing that society can change its mind
may make many kinds of socially undesirable behavior more attractive
the arrangements offering new credit to developing countries that are overextended ap-
pear to be of this form. An official amnesty may provide a way to terminate such un-
desirable behavior. Indeed, amnesties that will officially waive or reduce some debt
repayment by developing countries have been widely discussed, because it seems likely
that full-value repayments will never be made.62 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
and undercut social norms. Some observers might interpret an amnesty
for past marijuana offenses as a sign that an amnesty for cocaine will
eventually be offered.5
Finally, amnesties can make the transition to a new enforcement re-
gime seem more fair. When society systematically fails to enforce a law
over a long period, it implicitly creates a presumption that the offense is
not serious, encouraging otherwise honorable members of society to
choose noncompliance. Surveys suggest that as many as one third of
Americans think that tax cheating can be condoned. Under such circum-
stances, it may seem unfair to change the degree of enforcement, sub-
jecting those who offended under a known lax enforcement regime to
penalties consistent with a harsher view of the offense.6
Even for offenses regarded as serious, a longstanding failure to identify
and punish perpetrators may reduce the legitimacy of a later roundup. As
we debate how to improve enforcement of immigration lawssending
the message that ifiegal residence (or employing ifiegal aliens) is a se-
rious offensewe also consider amnesty for those who have been in
residence long enough. After so many years of ineffective action, it
seems unfair to enforce the law on those individuals now. Due process
requires fair warning.7 And for those who object that amnesty reduces
the legitimacy of the original system, the promise of stricter enforcement
in the future may be an adequate compensation. Both softies and disci-
plinarians may prefer a system with reduced penalties now and stiffer
penalties later to the status quo.
Indeed, some people oppose a tax amnesty because it would seem to make evasion less
of a crime. No doubt such thinking underlies the nearly universal agreement that any tax
amnesty would have to be backed by a much more rigorous enforcement effort. Whereas
the immigration amnesty is expected to decrease the scale of the enforcement problem
dramatically, no one expects tax amnesties to reduce evasion enough to permit a sub-
stantial relaxation of enforcement. More enforcement in the tax area will simply require
more resources devoted to this task.
The seemingly accidental and arbitrary enforcement of the Georgia law prohibiting sod-
omy, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, struck many observers this way. The
Court affirmed the state's right to prohibit sexual behavior it regards as illicit even if con-
ducted by consenting adults in their homes, but it did not comment on the differential
enforcement issue. That is, no one raised the issue of the constitutionality of enforcing a
law that is generally so casually enforced that apprehension would almost necessarily be
accidental.
Both privately and publicly, we generally avoid the apparent unfairness that comes from
changing our implicit contracts about enforcement. As our children grow older and
more responsible, we do not enforce rules retroactively even if they were aware of them.
We dedare that prior violations are exempt (amnestied), but that in the future punish-
ment will be consistent and more severe. The principle of not subjecting people to pun-
ishment more severe than what they can reasonably be said to have risked when they
commited the offense is embodied in our norms for parental behavior, our common law,
and our constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.AMNESTY, ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX POLICY. 63
Amnesties clearly have costs as well as benefits. First, they often an-
noy nondelinquents. One of the authors usually obeys speed limits and
thinks speeders should be ticketed; the other would like to drive faster
and feels like a chump because those who are driving faster are not
being arrested. Neither of us particularly likes the quasi amnesty we
observe.
Second, amnesties may have undesirable incentive effects. Will those
subject to the next military conscription remember that Vietnam draft
evaders were eventually given amnesty? Will that knowledge inappro-
priately tilt their choices in a socially undesirable direction? Why pay
parking tickets now if there will be an amnesty later? Why return any
library book now if you can keep it free until the next amnesty?
To minimize these incentive effects, officials declare many amnesties
to be on a "one-time-only" basis. If an amnesty is believed to be truly
unique, it affects only past actions, which cannot be changed, and should
have no impact on future decisions. But it may be hard to make a firm
commitment never to have another amnesty. If it made sense once, why
wifi it not make sense again? Moreover, many amnesties are clearly fore-
seeable. The United States has given amnesties for draft evasion after
each war; library amnesties are given regularly.8 In these instances, the
bad incentive effects of an amnesty were evidently thought to be out-
weighed by the benefits of drawing society back together.9
Amnesties have another potentially critical disadvantage: they under-
mine the strength of the social sanction against the amnestied behavior,
reducing the guilt felt by delinquents when they misbehave. Guilt,or its
cousin shame, is a highly efficient tool for social control. It is imposed
automatically, with certainty, for any misbehavior by anyone with a con-
science. And it works. Most people have many chances to steal with vir-
tually no chance of being caught, yet few do so. Societies therefore
expend great effort to instill the values that create conscience.
Even vigorous enforcement efforts can detect only a small fraction of
offenders. If we must rely on citizens' desire to avoid imposed penalties
(rather than shared values) to ensure compliance with the law, penalties
must be large enough to balance out the low probabffity of apprehension.
In fact, we may be reluctant actually to impose such severe punishment.1°
Other amnesties are also predictable. No victorious army in modern times has sought
permanently to enslave the defeated population (though that was a common practice for
thbusands of years). In this instance, of course, the incentive effect operates in the op-
posite direction. Knowing that it will not be enslaved, the enemy may not fight so hard.
The fact that amnesties yield present benefits and future costs sets up a political incen-
tive structure that may produce too many amnesties, as administrations with limited life-
spans hasten to collect the benefits while leaving many of the costs to their successors.
Western justice, perhaps still in the (no more than an) eye-for-an-eye tradition, has64 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
As guiltor, to put it positively, the warm feeling that comes from
being diligent and honestdiminishes as a force in the compliance deci-
sion, society must rely on the considerably more expensive and less effi-
cient approach of identifying and punishing delinquentsboth tasks
that must be conducted under strict rules protecting citizens' (and con-
victs') rights. If amnesties significantly reduce the guilt associated with
future noncompliance, they may be a bad bargain indeed.1'
3. Benefits and Costs of Tax Amnesties
In several respects, tax evasion is the kind of offense for which amnesty
is relatively likely, or at least plausible. No doubt some people became tax
delinquents by mistake and would now like to become honest citizens
but are deterred by the expense or embarrassment. A significant pro-
portion of taxes is evaded, nearly 20 percent at the federal level, it is
estimated. Tax evasion by one person does not directly harm other iden-
tifiable individuals. Most past tax evasion will be difficult to detect if it
has not already been identified, so a tax amnesty is making official what
is highly probable anyway.
Moreover, tax amnesties may provide the benefits often sought from
amnesties in other areas. They reduce guilt of evaders (many of them
otherwise ordinary citizens), a deadweight loss that hurts them without
helping anyone else. They provide direct benefits in the form of volun-
tary back tax payments. They help to reduce future noncompliance by
adding former delinquents to the tax rolls and removing the danger that
past malfeasance will be revealed. And, perhaps most important, am-
nesties smooth the transition to a new, harsher regime of tax law en-
forcement with fair warning.
But tax amnesties may also share the disadvantages of other amnesty
programs. Ordinary citizens who have been paying their taxes may feel
rarely incorporated probability of detection as a significant factor in setting penalties.
Partly for this reason, no doubt, penalties for tax noncompliance are quite low. The
charge for late payment is 5 percent of tax due per month up to a maximum of 25 per-
cent. The penality for negligence is only an additional 5 percent of the tax due. Clearly
our present scale of penalties is not designed for our present situation, where the prob-
ability of an audit is less than 1 percent, and even then an offense may not be provable
or even identified.
11. Undoubtedly there are even what economists call externalitiesguilt and legitimacy
effects felt beyond the specific arena of the amnesty. Indeed, this may be a critical argu-
ment against an amnesty for past toxic waste dumping, despite the health gains it
might offer by making future dumping less likely. The legitimacy of all society's rules
would be diminished if we announced that people who have risked the public health
may get off scot-free. Similarly, when we excuse past tax evaders, violators of all laws
look a little less disreputable, though the externality would seem to be less severe.AMNESTY ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX POLICY 65
unjustly treated either because they are denied vengeance or because
they are made to feel like chumps. Moreover, depending on the form of
amnesty granted and the perceived likelihood of repetition, tax am-
nesties might encourage evasion, allowing delinquents to hope they may
later be able to reconsider freely.
Many amnesties relate to single or sporadic offenses, such as a student
occupation of a college building, the possession of handguns when they
are declared ifiegal, or draft evasion during the Vietnam War. Our tax
program, by contrast, will continue indefinitely, and chiselers and cheat-
ers will always be among us. In this respect, tax amnesties resemble pro-
grams offering permanent residence status for long-time ifiegal aliens or
parking ticket amnesties. The amnesty must be viewed in terms of long-
term objectives of securing future compliancefor example, deterring
new ifiegal aliens by making them unemployable. That is why tax am-
nesties, and our nation's new immigration amnesty, are linked with stiff
enforcement programs for the future. We are trying not only to bring
past violators back into the fold as full-fledged citizens (a principal ob-
jective of the Vietnam draft amnesty) but also to prevent strays in the
future.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, amnesty for tax evasion may
make cheating seem less significant, reducing the guilt felt by those who
consider stretching their deductions or underreporting their income.
A substantial fraction of taxpayers may behave honestly because they
(probably incorrectly) believe cheating is likely to be detected, butmany
others probably comply because they believe it is the right thing to do.12
If amnesties make evasion seem forgivable and thus insignificant, they
may have serious financial consequences in reducing voluntary com-
pliance over the long run. In addition to equity losses, this will mean
higher and, therefore, less efficient tax rates.
The continuing nature of our tax collection system is a critical feature
distinguishing tax amnesty from, for example, a draft-evaders amnesty
for a particular war (which merely reduces penalties). A tax amnesty is
almost inevitably coupled with increased penalties and enforcement
efforts. The penalty schedule is twisted, not necessarily lowered. If
strong sanctions are prerequisites for maintenance of guilt and con-
science (and possible ostracism for offenders), then a tax amnesty could
actually be part of a guilt-strengthening effort.
12. We want tax evasion to have the moral connotation of stealing in contrast to offenses
like ifiegal parking, for which hardly anyone suffers pangs of conscience. (A decision
not to feed the meter seems merely a small wager with the parking department, of no
consequence beyond the money involved).66 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
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4. Tax Amnesty in Practice: The Massachusetts Experience
Nineteen states have conducted explicit tax amnesties in the last three
years, collecting about $1 billion in what they consider otherwise largely
uncollectible taxes from over 500,000 taxpayers. Three states are cur-
rently in the midst of amnesty periods; two others have legislative autho-
rization to begin amnesties soon. The programs have generally involved
forgiveness of criminal and civil penalties for those who came forward to
declare their delinquency and pay the tax they owed, together with a
(possibly substantial) interest charge for the "loan" they had obtained by
not paying earlier. Those whom the state has already informed of a sus-
pected delinquency are often excluded or given only partial amnesty.
The highly publicized Massachusetts program, which became some-
thing of an archetype, ran from October 17, 1983, to January 17, 1984. Its
avowed purpose was to collect revenue immediately, to permit transition
to a new regime of considerably tougher enforcement, and to increase
voluntary compliance in the future by getting current delinquents onto
the tax rolls and encouraging them to stay there. The program was, on
its own terms, wildly successful. Even the most optimistic forecasters
within the Department of Revenue had guessed that the immediate pay-
ments from amnestied taxpayers would not exceed $20 million. When
the dust settled and the 52,000 amnesty applications were tallied, the
state had collected $85 million, at a cost of only $2 million for extra staff
and other direct program expenditures. Amnesty payments were re-
ceived for every major tax the state imposes, though delinquencies re-
lated to personal and corporate income taxes generated well over half of
the payments. Over 60 percent of the payments were from taxpayers who
had not previously filed any information about the tax they came for-
ward to pay. Among income tax delinquents, about half of the delin-
quencies were for a single year, but over 20 percent were for four years
or more.
The Massachusetts amnesty was combined with a heightened empha-
sis on enforcement. The amnesty period was preceded by a series of
dramatic enforcement actions, including highly publicized seizures of
assets from taxpayers the state claimed were delinquent. New legislation
(which included the authorization for amnesty) had recently stiffened
the penalties for evasion, permitted felony prosecution for some particu-
larly flagrant evaders, allowed the Commonwealth to revoke the licenses
of or cancel contracts with delinquents, and provided additional staff
and enforcement resources (including new funds for computers to track
delinquents more reliably).
In this context, which presumably heightened the anxiety of delin-68 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
quents, the temporary amnesty period, announced with only one day
of public warning, was presented as a never-to-be-repeated chance to
get on the right side of the law. The enforcement agencies had been dis-
playing their new, sharper teeth. Many Massachusetts tax delinquents
probably had believed that the Commonwealth would never get serious
about tracking them down and collecting unpaid taxes and penalties.
Now suddenly things looked different. Assets were seized, restaurants
closed, hotels shut down. Tax evaders faced felony prosecution, and it
seemed as if some would actually go to jail. A surprising number of de-
linquents seized the opportunity offered by amnesty to pay up and stop
worrying about how much bite might be behind the bark.
But the direct payments made under the amnesty program were only
one class of benefit. The program also played an important role helping
Massachusetts move to a new period of stiffer enforcement without
seeming to break an implicit contract with taxpayers about how much
enforcement scrutiny there would be. Since concentrating the new en-
forcement resources on prior delinquents was likely to be procedurally
difficult and conceivably to appear unjust, and since only a small per-
centage of past delinquents was likely to be discovered, there was little
reason to try to clear out the inventory of delinquents through direct
enforcement. Why not declare an amnesty and let them pay up on
their own, particularly since this approach would probably yield more
13An individual who failed to come forward despite the amnesty
program would then seem fairer game for a stern penalty program.
Using an amnesty to smooth the rough edge of the transition also struck a
useful political compromise between self-avowed softies and hardliners.
The new enforcement regime is expected to have two major benefits:
(1) the state may be able to increase its collections from future delin-
quents substantially; (2) future voluntary compliance with the tax code
may be increased. Massachusetts has estimated both of these effects and
claims they are large in comparison with the direct returns of amnesty.
According to Department of Revenue figures, audit assessments pur-
13. In theory, individuals would multiply what they owe if caught by the probability of get-
ting caught and choose amnesty only if they save money on average. But several kinds
of conditions will make an amnesty in conjunction with a bolstered enforcement effort
likely to collect more revenues than the enforcement effort alone: (1) Individuals mis-
calculate or fail to calculate; the publicity accompanying the amnesty may encourage
them to participate. (2) Individuals are risk averse on the magnitude of fines. (3) There
are nonconservative penalties such as shame or jail. (4) Amnesty allows for legitimate
repentance and an escape from unfavorable self-perception. (5) Amnesty induces
enough discoverable delinquents to come forward that the population of remaining de-
linquents is reduced and their probability of discovery is increased. (6) Those who par-
ticipate in an amnesty may provide information that implicates other evaders, thus
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suant to the new enforcement efforts in fiscal years (FY) 1983 through
1985 exceeded those of the prior three-year period by $263 million. Total
collections of delinquent taxes (excluding receipts under amnesty) were
up $130 million over the same period. And, from a comparison of econo-
metric estimates of tax revenues (based on preamnesty behavior) with
actual collections in FY 1984 and 1985, the Commonwealth estimates
that improvements in voluntary compliance have resulted in $480 million
in extra tax payments across the two-year period (excluding the direct
collections from amnesty).'4
Since it is impossible to know exactly what level of tax payments
would have prevailed in the absence of tougher enforcement and am-
nesty, these estimates must be viewed with caution. They do suggest,
however, that the continuing payoffs from more vigorous enforcement
greater delinquent tax collection and more voluntary compliance
substantially exceed the direct revenues from the amnesty.
A few figures will put the gains from amnesty in perspective. Massa-
chusetts' revenues in FY 1984 were $5.8 bfflion. Direct amnesty revenues
(from an expressly one-time initiative) were $85 million, or 1.5 percent of
annual revenues. A generous estimate would put the measurable impact
of the amnesty and enforcement program at roughly $400 million per
year, or about a 6 percent increase in annual revenues. If there is greater
voluntary compliance now, there will be less delinquent tax to find and
assess later, which suggests that straight extrapolations based on short-
term state experiences would be generous indeed. But even if we cut
these figures by two thirds and consider a 2 percent increase in the per-
manent level of annual revenues, the impact is still far more important
than a one-time collection of 1 or 2 percent of revenues. The revenue
effectiveness of an amnesty and enforcement initiative depends pri-
marily on the extent to which it shifts collections permanently upward,
not how much it yields on a one-time basis.
5. The Effects of State Tax Amnesties
The roots of state tax amnesty programs are obscure. Iffinois sponsored a
small program in 1982, raising less than $100,000 in amnesty collections.
Large-scale programs began in 1983, when four states ran official tax am-
nesty programs. Of these, only Arizona collected more than $1 million
or more than 0.05 percent of state tax revenues; its collections were
nearly 0.3 percent of state tax revenues for the year. Seven states fielded
14. Such massive gains may not be repeated. Given higher voluntary compliance, presum-
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programs in 1984-programs straddling year-end are classified under
their concluding year-collecting over $250 million in total, with two
states (Massachusetts and Illinois) collecting 1.5 percent or more of state
tax collections in that year through amnesty payments. The following
year saw a large program in California, whichraised nearly $150 million,
about 0.5 percent of tax revenue. Several smaller states had moderate-
sized amnesty programs. There has been strong continuing interest in
1986, with New York collecting $360 million and Michigan $103 million
(about 1.7 percent and 1.1 percent of annual revenues, respectively).
Table 1TAX AMNESTY COLLECTIONS IN DOLLARS AND AS A
PERCENTAGE OF STATE TAX REVENUES, 1982-1986
Source: Summary figures from Massachusetts Department of Revenue; individual state departments of
























New Mexico 13.9 1.0




New York 363.2 1.7
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Table 1 summarizes the states' experience, showing the level of direct tax
amnesty collections both in dollars and as a fraction of state tax revenues.
Have amnesty programs affected compliance? Any analysis must deal
with worlds that never existed, since there is no control group of states
that have significantly bolstered enforcement without offering amnesty,
or offered amnesties without an increase in stringency. Thus we have no
way to know whether the Massachusetts program of tougher enforce-
ment would have been socially palatable and politically feasible, and
worked equally as well, in the absence of an amnesty. We can, however,
observe the growth of state tax revenues in states with and without am-
nesties. Table 2 shows the difference between the annual growth rate of
tax revenues in states with tax amnesties in 1984 and 1985 and in states
that had no tax amnesty. As the first column indicates, tax revenues grew
more slowly from 1980 to 1983 in states that later had tax amnesties than
in states that did not.15 If all states that had tax amnesties in 1984 and
1985 are included, their tax revenues grew about one percentage point
slower than other states in the period from 1980 to 1983. But from 1983 to
1985, when we would expect to see the effects of their tax amnesties,
these states' revenues grew faster than those of the other states, by ap-
proximately one-half percentage point. Thus, relative to states without
amnesties, the annual growth rate of tax revenues in amnesty states
shifted up by about one and one-half percentage points during the pe-
15. The slower growth of revenues in these states may have created particularly severe pres-
sure to find new revenues or improve their tax compliance.
Table 2 DIFFERENCES IN ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF TAX REVENUES
ETWEEN STATES WITH TAX AMNESTIES IN 1984 AND 1985 AND THOSE
WITHOUT TAX AMNESTY, 1980-1985
Figures in first two columns show difference between annual growth rate in tax revenues in states that
had amnesties in 1984 or 1985 and annual growth rate in tax revenues in states that had no amnesty.
Figures in third column show shift in growth rate of tax revenues in amnesty as compared to
nonamnesty states between early period (1980-1983) and later period (1983-1985).
5ource: Table 1 and U.S. Bureau of the Census, State tax collections, various years.
Amnesties 1980-1983 1983-1985 Shift
All 1.03 +0.50 +1.53





Collections> 3.44 +0.31 +3.73
1.0% of revenues72 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
nod in which the amnesties operated. (If the amnesty monies were non-
recurring, states running successful amnesties in 1984 would show no
exceptional increase in growth rates from 1983 to 1985.)
These results become stronger if we focus on states with particularly
large tax amnesty programs. As Table 2 indicates, in states with amnesties
collecting over 0.3 percent of state tax revenues, the annual growth rate
of tax revenues shifted up by 3.5 percentage points as compared with
nonamnesty states during the period of the amnesties, with slightly
larger shifts if the threshold is raised to 0.5 percent or to 1 percent of tax
revenues.
Looking solely at states with amnesties in 1984 provides some evi-
dence that the revenue growth effect persists beyond the year in which
amnesty operates. Table 3 shows the tax revenue growth rates between
1982 and 1985 for 1984 amnesty states; for the subset of 1984 amnesty
states with amnesty collections of more than 0.3 percent of 1984 tax reve-
nue; and for other states. In the period before amnesty took effect (1982
to 1983), tax revenues in the 1984 amnesty states grew more slowly than
in other states, by three to four percentage points. During the actual
operation of the amnesty (1983 to 1984), their revenues grew at a rate
closer to that of the other states, but stifi about two percentage points
lower. During the postamnesty period (1984 to 1985), their revenues
grew faster than in other states by one to two percentage points. The
shift is more dramatic for states with larger tax amnesties (as measured
by the fraction of state tax revenues collected through amnesty pay-
ments), presumably because of greater earlier noncompliance or more
vigorous gains in enforcement. These results are only suggestive, par-
ticularly because fiscal years and calendar years do not match in most
states, and in some cases amnesty revenue may be split across two tax
Table 3 ANNUAL TAX REVENUE GROWTH RATES FOR 1984 TAX
AMNESTY STATES AND OTHER STATES, 1982- 1985 (PERCENT)
Amnesty states
All 1984 tax amnesty
states
1984 tax amnesty states
with amnesty collections
> 0.3% of tax revenues
Nonamnesty states
Other states
Source: Table 1 and U.S. Bureau of the Census, State tax collections, various years.
1982 -1983 1983-1984 1984-1985
2.9 13.1 10.4
1.8 13.1 9.5
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years. Nevertheless, these figures suggest that the revenue growth asso-
ciated with amnesty and its accompanying enforcement persists beyond
the period in which amnesty is declared.
There are many differences between the economies and tax systems of
amnesty and nonamnesty states, which may explain some of the ob-
served shift in tax revenue growth rates. These results must therefore be
viewed with caution. Still, it is striking that in the period before they de-
clared their amnesties, the tax revenues of amnesty states were growing
more slowly than the national average; after tax amnesty, their revenues
grew faster than the national average. If amnesty, with an associated
greater enforcement effort, is not the explanation, it is at least strongly
correlated with whatever the deeper explanation might be. For states that
later had amnesty collections of over 0.3 percent of tax revenues, annual
growth in tax revenues in the period before amnesty was about two
thirds of the national average; after amnesty, it was slightly above the na-
tional average. (Background figures for these calculations are not pre-
sented in the tables.) This is quite a substantial shift; even if it does not
persist beyond these two years, it would lift tax revenues in these states
by 2 to 10 percent above what would have been expected on the basis of
the preamnesty period.
How much additional revenue flowed from these states' amnesty and
enforcement programs? To provide a crude measure, we projected what
tax revenues in 1984 and 1985 amnesty states might have been in the ab-
sence of amnesties if the difference from the national average in their
revenue growth rates before amnesty had persisted in 1984 and 1985.b6
Although the projections for each state are subject to considerable varia-
tion, the aggregate estimates provide a speculative basis for assessing the
total revenue gain associated with tax amnesty programs.
Using this approach, we estimate aggregate gains between $3 bfflion
and $5 bfflion from 1984 to 1985 in the tax amnesty states.17 Their actual
Proceeding state by state, we first measured the difference between each state's growth
in revenues and the national average growth for the preamnesty period. Using 1983
observed revenues, we then projected 1984 revenues in the absence of amnesty by as-
suming that the state's revenue growth rate would have continued to differ from the
national average by the same amount as in the preamnesty period. We then compared
the estimated revenues without amnesty to the revenues actually observed with the
amnesty programs in place. This amounts to fitting a fixed-effects model for state reve-
nue growth rates, with each state permitted to have growth differing from the national
average and to have its own "amnesty" effect. In particular, it assumes no regression
toward the mean. We place little reliance on the individual state results, preferring in-
stead to examine the aggregated results.
We obtain a range of estimates because there are various plausible ways to estimate
revenues in the amnesty states under the hypothetical scenario "without amnesty."
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revenues in that period were about $120 billion, so the extra revenues
apparently associated with their amnesty programs are about 3 to 5 per-
cent of the revenues collected.18
6. Toward a Federal Tax Amnesty Revenue Estimate
The apparent success of state tax amnesty programs, together with his-
toric federal budget deficits, has prompted a variety of proposals for
a tax amnesty program at the federal level. Governors of states with
successful experiences have pushed the idea. It has been proposed in
various forms in Congress. The president has expressed interest. The
commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has adamantly re-
sisted suggestions to pursue the idea, but proponents press on. The
sweeping tax reform package, recently signed into law, represents a
change in regimes that provides a perfect occasion for amnesty, and its
phasing provides a rather broad window of opportunity. A program
combining amnesty and stricter subsequent enforcement would be ex-
pected to increase voluntary tax compliance. Deficits would be reduced,
not by forcibly taxing away hard-earned dollars from reluctant taxpayers,
but through voluntary contributions from taxpayers happy to have an
opportunity to come clean and go straight. So argue the proponents of a
federal tax amnesty.
Can the state experience help us understand what might happen
under a federal amnesty? There are difficult hurdles to overcome in ap-
plying lessons from the state to the federal level. Knowledgeable com-
mentators have taken several tacks. Allen Lerman of Treasury's Office of
Tax Analysis has argued that analysis should be limited to amnesty
by itself, not amnesty in conjunction with an increase in enforcement
effort.19 There are two reasons to adopt this focus. First, it is a relevant
question in itselfwe may well wish to know the independent effect of
amnesty, not just the effect of amnesty combined with additional en-
forcement effort, because we can (and do) operate the two policies sepa-
projecting 1985 revenues one year forward from 1984 rather than two years forward
from 1983, and other small changes in assumptions result in minor variations in the
results. We are certain that other approaches to making these projections would lead to
different results and that alternative explanations having nothing to do with amnesty
could be advanced. Nonetheless, our results do not seem implausible, and they are
robust against small variations in the assumptions underlying the calculations pre-
sented here.
This counts revenues and tax amnesty gains for 1984 for the 1984 amnesty states only;
revenues and gains for 1985 are counted for both 1984 and 1985 amnesty states.
Allen H. Lerman, Tax amnesty: The federal perspective. National Tax Journal 39, no. 3
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rately. Second, we may regard the federal enforcement effort as already
adequate or, in any case, unlikely to be changed. If so, we again want to
focus on amnesty by itself.
Lerman estimates that the one-time revenue gains from federal am-
nesty per Se, net of costs and net of revenues actually captured by en-
forcement efforts rather than amnesty, would be about $1 billion. He
takes several different approaches to the estimate, obtaining roughly the
same answer each time.
We might, alternatively, try to estimate what a greater enforcement
effort would bring in by itself. Many have argued that since federal
tax enforcement is better than most states', state amnesty/enforcement
packages shed little light on what might be achieved at the federal level.
The IRS and analysts at the Office of Management and Budget (0MB)
have developed estimates showing how much additional revenue might
be collected through enhanced federal enforcement effort.2° These esti-
mates suggest that both the average and the marginal yield from enforce-
ment spending is dramatically greater than $1 per dollar spent and often
greater than $10 per dollar spent. Thus greater enforcement efforts at the
federal level should yield substantial revenues. Moreover, these esti-
mates systematically understate the productivity of more enforcement
activity, since they exclude the (possibly quite substantial) impact on vol-
untary compliance. This suggests that there is good reason and ample
room for sharpening the tax collector's teeth, even at the federal level.21 If
an amnesty would help us to move to more vigorous enforcement, some
proponents would view it as worthwhile for that reason alone.
The results presented above do not permit us to separate the effects of
enforcement and of amnesty; indeed, we cannot unequivocally attribute
the observed effects to the combination of enforcement and amnesty
programs. But, particularly in states with programs that attracted a
higher fraction of state tax revenues in amnesty payments, the combined
enforcement and amnesty activities tended to be prominent features of
the fiscal landscape in the year of amnesty. It seems likely that there is a
meaningful relationship between the shifts we observed in state tax reve-
nue growth rates and the launching of dramatic new enforcement efforts
See, for example, Frank Malanga, The relationship between IRS enforcement and tax
yield. National Tax Journal 39, no. 3 (1986): 333-37.
To maximize net revenues raised, enforcement would be pushed until the last dollar
yielded a dollar of revenue, since taxes paid are a transfer, whereas enforcement expen-
ditures represent real resource costs. The efficiency argument for greater enforcement
is that it leads to lower overall tax rates, thus reducing adverse consequences for incen-
tives. Many critics, of course, are more interested in the equity effects of enforcement,
its ability to distribute more equally the tax burden imposed on individuals with simi-
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and tax amnesty programs. And in states with programs perceived as
successful, virtually all participants seem to believe that the combination
of enhanced enforcement and amnesty worked a special form of magic.
Suppose, then, that we believe (on the basis of IRS and 0MB figures)
that there is room to enhance federal enforcement and that we do not
wish to separate out the independent effect of amnesty; rather, we want
to consider how much the federal government might obtain through a
combined enforcement/amnesty program. What might the state experi-
ence tell us about the prospects for such a program?
The most obvious problem in applying the state experience at the fed-
eral level is that the two tax bases have quite different compositions.
Many state amnesty programs seem to have been particularly attractive
to sales tax delinquents; the virtual absence of excise taxes at the federal
level limits the relevance of this part of the state experience. Even if we
confine our attention to income taxes, however, state amnesties collected
considerable delinquent revenue. Table 4 shows the amnesty collections
and the income tax-related portion for the four largest amnesty pro-
grams (data on Michigan, the last amnesty program to close, were not
available). Amnesty income tax collections as a fraction of annual in-
come tax revenues ranged from just under 1 percent to a bit over 3 per-
cent, with a weighted average of about 2 percent. Since total amnesty
collections in these states averaged less than 2 percent of total revenues,
income tax collections actually represented a larger proportion of am-
nesty payments than of tax payments overall.There is no obvious
reason to believe that federal revenues are less subject to amnestiable de-
22. This fact is most startling when we consider that virtually all income taxed by the states
is taxed by the federal govermnent as well, and that there is a matching program for tax
compliance between the two levels.
Table 4 AMNESTY COLLECTIONS AND INCOME TAXRELATED
AMNESTY COLLECTIONS FROM THE FOUR LARGEST TAX AMNESTIES
Source: Tax Foundation, Inc., Federal tax policy memo, April1986, p. 3.
Income tax amnesty
Total amnesty Income tax amnesty as fraction of
collections collections income tax revenues
($ million) ($ million) (%)
California 147 103 0.8
illinois 152 121 3.4
Massachusetts 85 52 1.5
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linquency than state revenues, at least not by virtue of their composition
across taxes.
A second problem is that the state data provideno direct evidence
about how many federal tax delinquents would take advantage ofan am-
nesty. There are many ways to cheat on state taxes and still stay within
bounds on federal tax impositions. An obvious example is the taxpayer
who files federal forms accurately but falsely claims residence ina low-
tax state. He or she has much to tell the state tax collector but nothing to
confess to a federal tax examiner. Many of the payments collected by
state programs were of this general form. Lerman's review of three state
amnesties found that well over 90 percent of those who took advantage
of the programs had already filed federal forms.By contrast, about
60 percent of those taking advantage of Massachusetts' amnesty had not
filed with the state. Only 1 percent were amending previously filedstate
forms.24 A second example is people who had already been caught by
federal auditors. They knew that the exchange of information between
the IRS and state tax collectors would eventually catchup with them;
many of them took advantage of the state amnesties as well.
This interaction of federal and state tax codes, enforcement, andeva-
sion cuts in both directions. How shall we interpret the fact thatmost of
the state amnesty filers were already in complianceon their federal
taxes? If it indicates that enforcement is much better at the federal level
so that taxpayers have cheated more on state than on federal taxes, then a
federal amnesty will raise less revenue than the state experience would
suggest. However, an alternative interpretation might be that statepro-
grams, which were offered without federal participation, were spurned
by a large group of noncomplying taxpayers who cheaton both federal
and state taxes.
Consider the situation of a taxpayer who has failed to report $2000 of
income on which he or she would have to pay a 5 percent state tax anda
42 percent federal tax. The state offers an amnesty enabling the delin-
quent to settle up for a small tax payment (and interest). But it is well
known that information on amnesty filers will be made availableto the
IRS. Thus taking advantage of the state amnesty wifi result ina much
larger tax, interest, and penalty liability at the federal level, withno relief
on the penalty part. This cannot have seemed a very attractive bargain. It
Lerman, Tax amnesty, n. 3.
Massachusetts Department of Revenue, The Massachusetts amnesty program: A statis-
tical synopsis. Mimeo (June 1986). The remaining 39 percent took advantage ofam-
nesty to pay debts already on tax collectors' books as accounts receivable without
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is no wonder that the overwhelming majority of taxpayers whotook ad-
vantage of the state programs were those already payingtheir federal
taxes (or those coming forward to pay state leviessuch as sales tax,
where there was no accompanying federal charge).
This argument suggests that state programs, however successful,
tapped only a portion of the state delinquencies; those that did not also
involve a federal delinquency. For this reason, estimating federal amnesty
revenue on the basis of state experiencesystematically underestimates
the federal revenue potential. The more that evaded state taxes are asso-
ciated with evaded federal taxes, the greater the underestimate is likely
to be.
Box 3 PROBLEMS IN EXTENDING STATE TAX AMNESTY EXPERIENCE TO
FEDERAL LEVEL
The federal tax base is considerably different from those of
states.
However, one can isolate the significant income tax evasion
reported in state amnesties. Net result: problem can be over-
come by using data from states on tax bases used byfederal
government.
Existing federal enforcement is better than states'.
IRS and 0MB estimates of benefits from additional enforce-
ment spending suggest high returns, though lower than at
state level. Net result: experience in states with less aggressive
enforcement overstates federal potential.
Most delinquents claiming state amnesty were irrcompliance
with federal code.
Appears to suggest that few amnesty takers were not in
compliance with federal rules. Also, many were reporting
errors and omissions with no federal cpnsequence (for ex-
ample, reporting income from New Hampshire rather than
Massachusetts). The absence of a federal amnesty, however,
prevented many in compliance with neither federal nor state
tax codes from claiming state amnesty, knowing that the infor-
mation filed would be made available to the IRS. Net result:
state experience probably underestimates federal potential.
Overall Result: Indeterminate, but state experience may well un-
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On net, we suspect, these arguments suggest that the state experience
wifi underestimate the potential of a federal tax amnesty. To be sure,
most of those who participated in the state programs were not federal
tax delinquents, at least not on these monies. However, federal penalties
create strong incentives for federal delinquents not to show up at state
amnesty offices. Their absence in the data testifies to their presence
of mind.
If extrapolating from the state experience provides an underestimate,
then an effective enforcement and amnesty program at the federal level
could yield quite substantial revenue. The one-time collectionif greater
than 1.5 percent of income tax revenues, as the collections in the four
largest state programs werewould be about $10 billion. If the growth
in federal revenues responds as state tax revenues apparently have, an
additional increase of 1 or 2 percent of annual revenues, and conceivably
much more, may be achievable, producing a continuing flow of about
$10 billion per year. It is true that we might get much of these increases
through stiffened enforcement alone, but without an amnesty a radical
change in enforcement procedures seems unlikely.
This estimate of the potential revenue from a combined federal am-
nesty and enforcement program does not seem unreasonable in light of
the amount and composition of federal tax noncompliance. In a widely
cited report on tax compliance published in1983,the IRS estimated that
approximately$90billion in income taxes went unpaid in 1981.26 As
Lerman observes, inflation would raise this total, and the reductions in
income tax rates and more effective records matching and other enforce-
ment would reduce it; it seems reasonable to guess that noncompliance
is of the same order of magnitude today. A portion of nonpaymentfor
example, the$9billion in unpaid taxes on the profits from ifiegal ac-
tivityis unlikely to be susceptible to either amnesty or enforcement (or
both). A substantial component, however, estimated at about $70 biffion
in1981,is from underreporting income and overstating deductions on
submitted tax returns. Some of the large accumulated store of such un-
acknowledged tax debts might well be susceptible to a well-managed
federal amnesty combined with vigorous new enforcement. An addi-
tional$3billion annually is due from tax returns that were never filed.
This form of evasion was a particularly fruitful source of payments dur-
Indeed, some would argue the trend at the federal level has been in the other direction.
The proportion of taxpayers now audited is less than half what it was twenty years ago.
The IRS argues that the lower audit rate is more than offset through better targeting,
electronic record matching, and other more effective modem information-processing
approaches.
U.S. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Income tax compliance research:
Estimates for 1973 1 981, Washington, D.C., July 1983.80 LEONARD & ZECKHAUSER
ing state amnesties. Although the federal situation for nonfilers is clearly
somewhat different (because federal taxpayers cannot claim that they are
filing in another jurisdiction, and therefore that they are not subject to
federal taxes), this might still be a source of considerable revenue under
a federal amnesty/enforcement package.27
Our estimates of the potential revenues cover a wide range; they are
subject to considerable doubt. The state experience is difficult to read by
itself, and it fits the federal situation only loosely. But if these figures are
of the right order of magnitude, they strongly suggest that a combined
enforcement and amnesty program at the federal level is well worth care-
ful consideration. They also indicate that a federal program is likely to be
moreprobably much moreeffective if combined with state amnesties.
We argued that the absence of a federal amnesty effectively blocked
many taxpayers' access to state amnesty programs, reducing those pro-
grams' effectiveness. The problem is less severe in reverse, because state
penalties and taxes due are generally much smaller than the federal lia-
bility an amnesty filer would voluntarily be accepting. Stifi, it may be
harder to admit "error" when one jurisdiction is forgiving, but another
calls you a tax evader (and penalizes you accordingly). There is no ob-
vious reason why states could not be encouraged to facilitate their citi-
zens' access to the federal amnesty by granting a coordinated umbrella
amnesty program. (Indeed, Nebraska has already authorized a con-
tingent amnesty program to take effect only in concert with a federal
amnesty.) To discourage free-riding states the federal government might
conceivably share information about taxpayers filing under the amnesty
program only with states that are participating, or might offer amnesty
only in conjunction with a state. Citizen ire might well force states to
comply. If a few states held out, the program would not be spoiled,
though revenues would be reduced.
Just how a federal program would workwhether states would coor-
dinate with it, how many taxpayers might accept the offer, what impact it
would have on future complianceremains in considerable doubt. It
seems clear, however, that the upside potential for revenue gains is
considerable.28
Lerman presents a similar argument. Since he concentrates on amnesty alone, how-
ever, his analysis answers a different question about the amount of revenue to be
gained from underreporting and overdeducting on previously filed forms. He argues
that amnesty alone will do little to bring forward those who have consciously evaded
their liabilities. Since we are analyzing a combined package of tougher enforcement
and amnesty, the $70 billion of "ordinary" tax shaving is a potentially considerable
source of revenue. See Lerman, Tax amnesty, pp. 329-31.
Several steps could be taken to make amnesties more likely to work. Many forms of tax
evasion involve more than one person; society might want to advertise that if you haveAMNESTY, ENFORCEMENT, AND TAX POLICY 81
7. Explicit Amnesties Within Implicit Amnesties: V'Ihat Is
Really Different?
Society's preference for obtaining confessions rather than convictions
generally leads it to offer lower penalties for those who voluntarily admit
wrongdoing. There are both moral and strategic reasons for this ap-
proach. Thus, an explicit amnesty may be simply a more extreme or
better publicized form of a general policy of (partial) forgiveness for the
contrite confessed offender. So it is with tax amnesty programs, which
generally waive criminal and civil penalties (at least for those who do not
already know they are under investigation). But the open secret is that in
virtually all jurisdictions criminal penalties and many civil penalties are
routinely waived for those who voluntarily disclose and agree to pay tax
delinquencies. Except for the most flagrant tax evasions, the outcome of
an investigation is some form of confession of error or miscalculation by
the delinquent, combined with payment of the back taxes and interest,
sometimes including late payment or failure-to-file penalties.
The penalties are low to start withat the federal level, a maximum of
25 percent of tax liability for late payment and an additional 5 percent for
negligence. But even these penalties may be abated in cases with extenu-
ating circumstances, which means in practice that they are sometimes
negotiated in return for resolution by agreement rather than through liti-
gationthat is, in return for some form of confession. Both state reve-
nue departments and the IRS abate many of the penalties they assess in
the ordinary course of their business; last year the IRS waived nearly 40
percent of the penalties its rules imposed, letting over 4 million taxpayers
off the hook for nearly $2 billion in penalties. Since 1978, the IRS has
provided abatements to nearly 20 million taxpayers. Commenting on the
IRS's practices, Ira Jackson, commissioner of revenue in Massachusetts,
observed, "Amnesty merely offers on a wholesale basis what tax part-
ners in big eight accounting firms and every well-informed tax lawyer
routinely obtain for their clients on a retail basis."29
This assessment, accountants tell us, may somewhat overstate the case.
Most penalties are not abated, though some questionable penalties are
waived swiftly as part of deals. Nevertheless, the offer of amnesty bears
important similarities to what is generally available to delinquents who
ever colluded to avoid taxes you had better take advantage of amnesty because your
partners might do so, and we will chase down others involved in schemes that come to
light under amnesty. Even snitching could be given greater rewards.
29. Ira Jackson, speech to National Tax Association, Tax Institute of America, May 19, 1986,
p. 11. Jackson discusses the figures cited above on the frequency with which the IRS
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come forth voluntarily. Amnesty differs in four ways: (1) the (relatively
small) difference in the terms available, (2) publicity, (3) its importance as
an element of a political compromise and as a signaling mechanism fos-
tering a change to a new regime of stricter enforcement, and (4) its inclu-
sion of elements of pardon and redemption.
Which of these features account for the dramatic amnesty collections
of the successful states? Surely not the first: a small change in the terms
of the deal cannot explain such a sudden influx to the confessional. The
second and third factors are related, for amnesties appear to be effective
mainly because they are publicized (and therefore draw in many more
delinquents) and they permit the curtain to be raised on a new enforce-
ment regime. (The fourth factor is best assessed by psychologists and
theologians, not by the economist authors.)
Although any policy of negotiated penalties creates equity problems
some know the penalty structure and others do not, and some have
better negotiatorsit has the virtue of permitting differentiation among
violators. Whatever our reasons for giving amnesty, we are presumably
more inclined to give it for some offenses than for others. There is no
reason why an amnesty need be a blanket forgiveness, and state pro-
grams have generally not been.
Amnesties could be selectively defined. If we want to forgive only
small errors, a ceiling can be set. If we think the reporting of some forms
of income is more subject to error, and others more to abuse, we may
selectively permit amnesty for errors in the types of income less often
abused. An amnesty can be selective in the kinds of filers it excuses, the
kinds of errors it forgives, the period it covers, and so on. The starting
point need not be taxes filed before today; two years from now, the
federal government could initiate a selective amnesty that would cover
all filings under the "old" tax code but none under the new code. A
well-designed selective program could retain much of the benefit of a
broader, wholesale clearing of the slate accompanied by stiff penalties
for those who do not take advantage of society's "generous offer." An
amnesty/enforcement package allows society to ask the repentant sheep
to step aside from the incorrigible goats, and it comes with a strong mes-
sage that the remaining goats will be pursued. Many erstwhile goats may
be induced tO convert voluntarily to sheephood.
8. Conclusion
Whatever its ultimate effects, an amnesty may seem to represent a relax-
ation of tax enforcement efforts. Some observers are concerned that suchNo Amnesty
Amnesty
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a program would unacceptably undercut the legitimacy of our tax code
and of our laws generally. Most citizens seem to pay their taxes primarily
as a matter of conscience. If tax amnesties diminish the force of con-
science, spreading the message that tax evasion is commonplace and
easily forgiven, they may diminish compliance and force society to raise
taxes and rely more heavily on less efficient enforcement mechanisms.
This is a serious potential liability, which leads to a political prediction:
should there be a federal amnesty, it wifi, like the prominent state am-
nesties, be linked with a vigorous new enforcement effort. This coupling
would reinforce the virtues of strict enforcement. Any punished indi-
viduals would have rejected the opportunity to come forth. They could
no longer be thought of merely as tax shaversthey would have volun-
tarily chosen, in the face of a generous offer of reconciliation, to remain
tax cheaters.
The loss of conscience should not be a problem in a well-orchestrated
enforcement and tax amnesty program. Publicized seizures, arrests,
prosecutions, fines, audits, and notices signal that tax evasion has unfor-
tunate consequences, that it is being taken more seriously, that those
who do not comply wifi be an increasingly small and besieged minority.
Amnesty is a way out before the trap springs shut. The penalty scale is
twisted, not reduced. Evasion is made no less a crime.
An amnesty may provide a socially valuable opportunity to set things
straight, to move to a more desirable equilibrium with more widespread
honest citizenship and greater punishment of violatorsthat is, with
sharper differentiation between those observing and those outside the
social compact.
Though it is conceivable that a strict enforcement program might be
Box 4 POSSIBLE TAX POLICY PROGRAMS
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enacted by itself, the inclusion of an amnesty would offer four advan-
tages. First, merely considering the subject would give the issue new
prominence, define it in new terms, get it on the policy agenda, and link
it to the tax reform. Second, it might help strike a political balance and
foster innovation by making the new outcome appear to be less of a
departure from the status quo. Third, the amnesty would represent a
way to provide identifiable funds needed for an additional enforcement
effort.3° Fourth, in conjunction with the enforcement program, the am-
nesty would reconfigure the tax penalty schedule in a manner that would
probably increase revenues both in the short run (because of the incen-
tives to pay up) and in the long run (because paying old debts reduces
future costs of compliance).
Our view of the world is summarized in Box 4. If these political prog-
nostications are accepted, the relevant comparison when considering an
amnesty wifi be between boxes A and D of Box 4, the status quo and a
new regime offering an amnesty coupled with future strictenforcement.
Our review suggests that an effectively managed federal tax amnesty
program combined with an advertised enhancement ofenforcement
might potentially raise significant revenue, perhaps about $10 billion,
with continuing substantial revenue gains, albeit of highly uncertain
magnitude. Although there are no guarantees such a program will work,
the crude estimates of potential gains are large enough to warrant a full-
fledged consideration of an amnesty program. And since each enforce-
ment dollar yields many dollars in revenue, quite apart from its effects
on nurturing compliance, if the discussion of amnestymerely pushes
enforcement issues into Congressional debate, it wifi certainly have been
worthwhile.
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